Determinants of young Europeans' decision to leave the parental household by Ghidoni, Michele
Determinants of young Europeans’ decision to leave the parental household 
  1 
 
Determinants of young Europeans’ decision to leave 
the parental household 
Michele Ghidoni






The analysis of household formation has found limited space in the economic 
literature until very recently, and the articles in other social sciences are fairly 
descriptive in nature. None of all these attempt cross-country quantitative analyses and 
only few estimate dynamic models within a country, while many are cross-sectional 
studies of living arrangements. Since there are large differences in household structure 
within Europe, I used several datasets (ECHP, BHPS and SOEP) to study the patterns 
across the continent. I posited a simple theoretical framework and estimated a dynamic 
model of departure of young Europeans from the parental home. I analysed how the 
determinants of departure from the parental household compare and whether the 
differences in residential decisions can be explained by looking at children’s and 
parents’ income and labour market characteristics. Firstly, I showed that a model with 
multiple destinations (moving out of home to move in with a partner, moving out without 
a partner, and remaining at home) is more appropriate than the dichotomous approach 
mostly found in the literature. Secondly, I found that for Southern European males 
economic circumstances are very important: only current income and employment 
status affect departure. I also observed that higher family income discourages 
departures particularly in Southern Europe. The low departure rates in the South 
therefore seem to be the result of limited labour market opportunities: children in the 
South stay at home as long as they have not secured a job. 
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1  Introduction 
While many studies and articles have been written on household formation, most of these 
have been confined to the sociological or demographic areas, with more emphasis on 
description than on quantitative analysis. There are only few publications on this topic in 
economics journals. None of all these, however, attempts cross-country quantitative analyses 
and only few estimate dynamic models within a country, while many are cross-sectional 
studies of living arrangements. 
The purpose of this paper is to estimate a dynamic model of departure of young 
Europeans from the parental home. The focus is on Europe because there are large 
differences in household structure between countries ( Iacovou (1998)). I analyse how the 
determinants of departure from the parental household compare and whether the differences 
in residential decisions can be explained by looking at children’s and parents’ income and 
labour market characteristics. 
 
A look at the EU situation in 1995 shows that children at all ages are more likely to be 
living with their parents in Southern Europe (Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal, or the “South”) 
than in the rest of the Union (the “North”). The differences become quite marked from the mid-
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           ￿￿￿￿ males ￿￿￿     ￿￿￿ females ￿￿￿ 
  Country  18-23  24-29  30-35    18-23  24-29  30-35 
_____________________________________________________ 
   GREECE   0.86   0.66   0.30     0.70   0.31   0.10 
    ITALY   0.97   0.76   0.32     0.93   0.54   0.18 
    SPAIN   0.97   0.70   0.29     0.92   0.55   0.21 
 PORTUGAL   0.94   0.67   0.23     0.89   0.47   0.18 
  AUSTRIA   0.82   0.46   0.23     0.68   0.24   0.11 
   FRANCE   0.80   0.29   0.09     0.67   0.15   0.03 
  GERMANY   0.86   0.36   0.07     0.70   0.13   0.02 
 LUXEMBOU   0.93   0.37   0.13     0.77   0.19   0.07 
  BELGIUM   0.93   0.46   0.08     0.82   0.20   0.06 
       UK   0.78   0.27   0.08     0.56   0.11   0.03 
  IRELAND   0.93   0.48   0.18     0.84   0.33   0.09 
       NL   0.71   0.19   0.02     0.54   0.05   0.01 
  DENMARK   0.58   0.08   0.02     0.38   0.02   0.01 
  FINLAND   0.57   0.12   0.06     0.36   0.03   0.01 
_____________________________________________________ 
Table  1- share of young people who are living with at least one of their parents  
(“children”) (weighted) 1994-6 – Source: ECHP
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The probability of a child leaving at early ages appears to be much lower in the South. The 
median child to leave will be, therefore, much older in the South than in the North, as shown 
in the table below. This is true of both males and females. 
 
___________________________________________________________ 
  Country                       median age 
                      MALES       FEMALES 
___________________________________________________________ 
   GREECE               28                   25              
    ITALY               29                   26              
    SPAIN               29                   27              
 PORTUGAL               29                   26              
  AUSTRIA               25                   24              
   FRANCE               24                   22              
  GERMANY               24                   21              
 LUXEMBOU               24                   24              
  BELGIUM               25                   23              
       UK               24                   21              
  IRELAND               26                   24              
       NL               23                   21              
  DENMARK               21                   19              
  FINLAND               21                   19              
___________________________________________________________ 
Table 2- median age of leaving the parental home (weighted)- 1996 – Source: ECHP 
 
The variation in departure patterns clearly leads to variation in the average age of children 
staying at home, as shown in  Table  3 below. Considering only children aged 18-35 (to ignore 
differences due to fertility rates), one can notice that a Southern European who is living with 
their parents is likely to be, on average, nearly two years older than a Northern European also 
living with their parents. 
The differences are large and significant between Northern and Southern countries, and 
mostly within each group as well. 
 
_________________________ 
                sex       
  Country    male  female 
_________________________ 
   GREECE    24.5    22.8 
    ITALY    24.3    23.5 
    SPAIN    24.1    23.6 
 PORTUGAL    23.5    23.3 
  AUSTRIA    24.6    23.3 
   FRANCE    22.5    21.7 
  GERMANY    22.8    21.6 
 LUXEMBOU    23.8    22.7 
  BELGIUM    23.0    22.2 
       UK    23.0    21.9 
  IRELAND    22.8    22.2 
       NL    21.8    20.7 
  DENMARK    20.8    20.2 
  FINLAND    21.8    20.2 
_________________________ 
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The general pattern, described in  Iacovou (1998), is that children in the South tend to  be 
single,
5 childless and living with their parents until a relatively late age, and when they finally 
leave, they do so to marry and have children. Young people in the “North”, by contrast, tend 
to leave the parental home earlier to live on their own, or with friends, or with a partner (to 




2  Literature 
The analysis of household formation has found limited space in the economic (theoretical 
and empirical) literature until very recently. Although this topic has been explored in other 
social sciences, the many sociological and demographic single-country and cross-country 
studies are fairly descriptive in nature. Research in this area is difficult because detailed 
information is needed on both children and parents for more than one period (cross-sections 
are less suitable). There are only few econometric studies using panel data, virtually only for 
the US and the UK, while cross-sectional studies exist for Australia, Italy, Spain, Sweden and 
few other countries; none of these, however, performs cross-country analyses. Studies based 
on time-series data are rare (Åsberg (1999), p. 119). 
 
Becker (1991)’s work and the economics of the family literature does not focus on the 
specific issue of children’s departure from home. The first model is  McElroy (1985), which 
analyses the joint determination of market work and household membership for young 
American males, based on Nash-bargaining between parents and children, and she finds that 
parents insure their sons against poor labour market opportunities.  Ermisch and Di Salvo 
(1997) and  Ermisch (1999) present a model of young people’s decision to live apart from their 
parents where they predict the impact of income and housing market variables. Their studies 
derive predictions about the impact of the price of housing, child’s and parents’ income on the 
probability that a young adult lives away from their parents.  Manacorda and Moretti (2000) 
present a model of non-cooperative bargaining between children and parents, with and 
without altruism, using different functional assumptions but drawing conclusions similar to the 
previous authors.  Some recent papers show that family structure is endogenous to credit 
market constraints and labour market conditions (Fogli (2000), Díaz and Guilló (2000)).  
Most empirical papers estimate a model of living arrangements in a standard utility 
maximisation framework. The main choice for a child is between living with one’s parents and 
living outside the parental home; sometimes different destinations are allowed for. A large 
part of empirical analyses on youth departure uses cross-sectional data, i.e. current living 
arrangements, and only few use dynamic models, eg, hazard functions. The covariates that 
are used are the ones that are expected to be important to explain why utility outside the 
parental home may be different from utility when living with one’s parents, ie, covariates 
whose marginal utility is different under the two living arrangements. These variables are 
usually child’s income, rental costs,
6 parental income, parental wealth, health status of child 
and parents, and demographic variables. Many authors pool men and women together in the 
estimation. There is no standard way of including income variables: some authors assume 
that they are all exogenous (current labour income, for example), others calculate a potential 
wage for part-timers and non-workers, generally without  – apparently  - correcting standard 
errors ( Whittington and Peters (1996),  Haurin et al. (1997),  (Åsberg (1999)) and sometimes 
using the actual wage for full-time workers ( Åsberg (1999)), some use parental or family 
(excluding the child’s) income, mostly unstandardised;  Aassve, Billari, and Ongaro (2000) 
controls for initial conditions and uses current income. 
The typical results are  that own earnings are significant (but this variable may be 
endogenous) and increase the probability of living outside the parental household; potential 
earnings appear to have a positive effect, too, but the results are usually not very robust; 
higher parental earnings tend to be associated with longer cohabitation (but results are not 
clear-cut); females are more likely to reside without their parents, as are those with a partner 
and/or with children; age increases the probability of independent living (showing an 
increased desire for privacy), but at a declining rate. Some papers point out that some 
covariates (eg, parental income) have different effects on different destinations (living in with 
a partner vs. living in with others or alone, see Ermisch and Di Salvo (1997), Buck and Scott 
(1993)). Generally, most papers have focused on whether certain variables affect residence 
                                                 
5 Ie, not living with a partner. Note that a significant share of Southern Europeans who are married still cohabit with 
their parents or parents-in-law. 
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outside the parental household or not, and in which direction, but they have found it very 
difficult to estimate coefficients (and elasticities) precisely and to assess their magnitude. 
 
There are three papers that provide the most useful benchmark for my results. 
For Italy, Aassve, Billari, and Ongaro (2000) use the first two waves from the Italian sub-
sample of the ECHP to estimate a probit model of departure from the parental home that 
includes a selection term (similar to Heckman’s) to account for sample selection for those 
people who are already living without their parents in the first wave. They show that being 
employed has a very large effect o n departure rates: for employed men in the second to 
fourth quartiles, the marginal effect is more than 10 percentage points. However, their 
standard errors are very large (the true effect could be, roughly, between 3 and 18 
percentage points. Unusually, the authors do not include age terms in the departure equation 
(only in the selection one). The same is true, to a lesser extent, for women. Since older 
Italians are much more likely to be employed and on high incomes, the effect of being 
employed and on a  high salary may in fact be capturing an age effect. There is a negative 
effect of the regional unemployment rate (in levels) on men’s departure, but this is very small 
(-0.003, s.e. 0.001)). They find very weak evidence of an effect of parental income. 
For the UK, Ermisch (1999) takes into account multiple destinations, but he estimates only 
dichotomous models where he pools males and females together (and only uses actual 
income).  Whereas the “full” probit ( probability of departure from the parental home) gives 
mostly significant coefficients, when multiple destinations are analysed (probit on moving in 
with a partner conditional on being at home and not  having a partner; probit on moving in 
without a partner conditional on being at home and not having a partner) the coefficients on 
own income become significant only at the 10% level and parental income loses the 10% 
significance (with negative coefficients, ie higher parental income delays departure) it had in 
the “full” probit. He finds that having been unemployed in the past year increases departures 
without a partner, as if the youth had to move out to find a job. Ermisch (1999)’s results seem 
to show  that the covariates may not have very strong effects (this may partly be due to 
significant differences between genders). 
For Germany, Gartner (2000) uses the SOEP (West Germany’s subsample only) to study 
departure  from home. He defines the destinations quite differently from most other 
researchers (“moving into a single household” is the case in which the child moves out of the 
parental home to live on their own, without anyone else in the household, and “moving into a 
household with more than one person” is the other possible destination; having or not a 
partner in the new household is not relevant to the analysis. Other researchers, including the 
present author, use as destinations a household without own partner ( “move without a 
partner”) and a move to live with a partner (“move with a partner”). What Gartner classifies as 
moves into a more-than-one-person-household therefore includes the more common “move 
into a partnership” but also some moves into non-partnership living arrangements. This 
makes results extremely difficult to compare with the rest of the literature because moving in 
with friends and moving in with a partner seem very different concepts.
7 He estimates a 
multinomial logit model, for which he reports coefficients but not marginal effects. For men, he 
finds a strong effect of being employed full-time, while all other labour market situations are 
not significantly affecting departure. Pro-capita family income (including own) and parents’ 
education have  no effect.  For women, he finds that being employed or under training 
increases departures to multi-person households, but only being under training increases 
departures to single-households. Per capita family income is significant and negative, but the 




3  Theoretical framework 
Young people’s decision of household formation is typically modelled in a utility 
comparison framework, where  the child compares his utility when living with his parents and 
when on his own). This was the approach chosen by McElroy (1985), who derived the indirect 
utility functions for child and parents in a Nash bargaining model. Most subsequent studies 
use a similar framework.
8 
                                                 
7 To my knowledge, there is no research to prove that those destinations can be grouped together. In this study, I am 
assuming that moving into a single household (with nobody else) and moving in with other but without a partner are 
homogeneous enough destinations to be grouped together. 
8 A more refined approach can be found in Aassve (2000), where a simple search theoretic model is presented. Determinants of young Europeans’ decision to leave the parental household 
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Let us consider a child and his family.
9 The child has the following utility function: 
( 3.1)  U
C(Cc, hc, OUT)         OUT = 0, 1      
that he maximises subject to a budget constraint 
( 3.2)  Yc + T(OUT)= Cc + OUTi ph hc 
hc is child’s housing consumption, for which he has to pay when living without his parents; 
Cc is child’s consumption excluding housing;  Yc is child’s total income;  OUT is a dummy 
indicating whether the child lives outside the parental household ( OUT=1) or within 
(OUT=0);
10  T(OUT) is the amount of financial transfers from parents to child, which depend 
on whether the child is coresiding ( T(0) or away ( T(1)); ph is housing costs. The subscript c, 
as in  hc, refers to the child, while the subscript p refers to the parents. When the child lives 
with his parents, his budget constraint becomes a’)  Yc + T(0) = Cc; otherwise it is a’’) Yc + 
T(1)= Cc +  ph hc. 
The parents are assumed to be altruistic, and therefore their utility function is a function of 
the child’s utility and of their own consumption. 
( 3.3)  U
P = U
 P(Cp, hp, IN, U
C(Cc, hc, OUT))    OUT = 0, 1   s.t. 
( 3.4)  Yp = Cp + ph hp + T(OUT)    
( 3.5)  T(OUT) ‡0 
Ermisch and Di Salvo (1997),  Ermisch (1999) and  Manacorda and Moretti (2000) build 
their predictions and empirical analyses within this framework, substantially improving upon 
McElroy (1985)’s model. Parents can influence their child’s residential decision by deciding 
the amount of financial transfers, which depends on their degree of altruism. Manacorda and 
Moretti introduce the idea that parents’ utility may depend on whether they are cohabiting with 
their child: this is reflected by the IN term in ( 3.3). 
The model has therefore two stages: in the first stage, parents choose financial transfers, 
their own consumption of housing and other goods to maximize ( 3.3) subject to ( 3.2), ( 3.4), 
(  3.5)  above. In the second stage, the child maximizes his own utility, taking the parental 
decisions as given, and thus chooses whether to cohabit. Ermisch and Di Salvo (1997) note 
that it is effectively the parents deciding the residential status of the child (assuming complete 
information on preferences). But  Manacorda and Moretti (2000) add that if the parents are 
very altruistic, their child will receive so large a transfer that he will inevitably decide to live 
outside the parental home, because T(0)- T(1) cannot be large enough. 
The effect of incomes, housing costs and other variables can be d erived, but their signs 
depend on the choice of some functional form for the utility function; Ermisch and Di Salvo 
(1997)  and  Ermisch (1999) use a constant elasticity of substitution function (that nests the 
Cobb-Douglas) while  Manacorda and Moretti (2000) use a Stone-Geary function, but their 
main conclusions are broadly similar:  i) the utility of both parents and child depends on 
cohabitation (generally, a child values his privacy);  ii)  from a financial point of view, total 
housing costs are lower when the child lives with his parents, and there may be other 
economies of scale;  iii) financial transfers from parents to the child increase with the gap 
between parental income and child’s income and with the degree of altruism of the parents; 
iv) altruistic parents may decide to support the child whatever his residential decisions,
11 and 
they will find it “cheaper” to support him during cohabitation thanks to the presence of local 
public goods and economies of scale (ie, total family income minus total housing costs is 
higher when cohabiting);  v) financial transfers from parents to child have an important effect 
on the child’s decisions (analytical results predict that higher parental income reduces 
departure rates);
12  vi)  the impact of the cost of housing depends on demand elasticity for 
housing. 
In this framework I want to  understand what determines young people’s residential 
choices. Let the child’s indirect utility function when living away from his parents in period t be: 
( 3.6)  Vt
OUT = Vt




Parental income is included because of the possibility of financial transfers from parents. 
The vector  xt includes all other possible variables of relevance, eg, age, country, 
unemployment rate, potential wage, own health status, parental health, etc. ut
OUT is a zero-
mean random variable that affects preferences for privacy. 
                                                 
9 For simplicity’s sake I assume that in each family there are two parents and one child. In the empirical section, 
parental income needs to be normalised by household size, which I will do, since children must share parental 
resources. 
10 For simplicity, I define OUT=1-IN and I use the most straightforward dummy in each case. 
11 Ermisch and Di Salvo (1997) find conditions that show that when parental income is much higher than child’s 
income, financial transfers are made in both residential states T(1)>0 and T(0)>0, when parental income is too low 
there are no transfers at all, while in the intermediate range transfers are made only when the child lives apart. 
12 Most surveys do not ask about financial transfers from parents to child if the child is cohabiting (the relevant ECHP 
question is “Did you personally receive in 199x any financial support or maintenance from relatives, friends or other 
persons outside your household?”, italics added), but they must clearly take place, if the child has no or little source 
of own income. Determinants of young Europeans’ decision to leave the parental household 
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Utility when living with parents at time t is represented by the indirect utility function: 







IN includes all other possible variables of relevance and  ut
IN is a zero-mean random 




Following Ermisch (1999), a young person lives apart from his parents if 
( 3.8)  Vt








If the indirect utility functions are linear, this becomes, in the simplest case: 
(3.9) (b OUT,1- b IN,1)yct + (b OUT,2 - b IN,2)ypt + (b OUT,3 -b IN,3)pht + (y yOUT - y yIN)xt + (ut
OUT - ut
IN) > 0 
xt includes xt
IN and xt
OUT. The b s and the y ys coefficients are the parameters of the indirect 
utility functions, s = OUT, IN. 
As derived in the theoretical literature surveyed earlier, one can expect: 
( 3.10)   (b OUT,1 - b IN,1)>0 in all cases 
( 3.11)   (b OUT,2 - b IN,2)<0 in most cases
14 
( 3.12)   (b OUT,3 - b IN,3)<0 if parents’ demand for housing is price inelastic. 
Differences in taste will affect the term (ut
OUT - ut
IN). If some of these preferences are due 
to fixed effects and the rest can be attributed to a random error, this term can be rewritten as: 
( 3.13)   (ut
IN - ut
OUT)i =q i + u it 
for child i, i=1, …, N. q i (the fixed effect) and u it are mutually independent, and u it is an iid 
random variable. 
One may wish to estimate the following index function measuring the propensity for child i 
to live outside the parental home at time t (the child leaves home if I>0, and stays otherwise): 
( 3.14) IOUT,t = (b OUT,1 - b IN,1) yct + (b OUT,2- b IN,2) ypt +(b OUT,3 - b IN,3) pht +(y yOUT - y yIN) xt +q i+ u it
 
or, after substituting b k = (b OUT,k - b IN,k), k =1, 2, 3, and y y=(y yOUT - y yIN): 
( 3.15)  Ii,t = b 1 ycit-1 + b 2  ypit-1 + b 3 phit +  y yxt +q i+ h it  
I >0 implies that the child lives outside the parental home, while I £0 implies that he lives 
with his parents. In a static framework, however, strong assumptions are needed on q i + u it for 
consistency. The fixed effect may be correlated with income, for example because a stronger 
desire for independence may be associated with higher income ( McElroy (1985) and  Haurin 
et al. (1997) also assume that leaving home and labour market choices are simultaneously 
determined).  Chamberlain (1980)’s conditional logit estimator can yield consistent estimates 
of the  b  coefficients under the assumption of logistic distribution for u it
 but without requiring 
u it‘s independence of the explanatory variables.
15 On the whole, a static model is problematic, 
because  i) It requires more instruments, as contemporaneous variables on the right hand-side 
may be correlated w ith the error; ii) it requires more explicit dealing with the simultaneity of 
housing and labour market activity decisions; iii) it may suffer from serious problems due to 
attrition;  iv) it may not be very useful towards the understanding of the determinants of 
departure from the parental home, because cross-sectional observations are the results of 
past decisions, which may have become irreversible, and are due to the joint effect of 
children’s departures and returns. 
 
Dynamic framework 
A panel extension o f the static model may overcome many of the difficulties above (as 
suggested, for example, by Ermisch (1999), whose model I extend). I concentrate on young 
people who are still residing with their parents at time t-1, and for them it must be: 
(3.16)  Vt-1








Similarly, for one of these children to leave the parental home in period t it must be 
( 3.17)  Vt








Therefore, the probability that a child leaves home in period t conditional on living with his 
parents at t-1 is  




OUT £ V i,t-1
IN
 ) 
From here, one could build a model in first differences. But there are two problems: firstly, 
young people who leave home have relatively high attrition, and there is very little information 
                                                 
13 I am therefore allowing for coresidence being a good or bad, or irrelevant to the child, depending on the values of u 
for each child. Whether cohabitation is a good for the parents will have an effect on the impact of parental income on 
youth’s utility, as parents will have to be more generous to retain their children. 
14 Except when parents’ utility is lower during cohabitation and altruism is not strong enough to compensate for this, a 
case which is probably rare. 
15 Note, however, that in the empirical section one could use parents’ “permanent income” rather than current income 
if parents are not liquidity constrained, and this variable will be broadly constant over time. Thus (bOUT,2 - bIN,2) will 
generally be unidentifiable. All coefficients on variables that do not change over the length of the panel, such as 
gender, and possibly education. Determinants of young Europeans’ decision to leave the parental household 
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on their situation at time  t, although I  often have information on the other members of the 
original household; secondly, there are endogeneity problems for variables at time t, because 
a child who has left home is much more likely to be working, and the causality may run from 
departure to income, or viceversa. 
By using individual’s information at time  t-1, or earlier, to explain departures between time 
t-1 and  t, the risk of endogeneity is reduced. Exogenous covariates relative to the interval t-1 
to  t (eg, housing costs, regional unemployment)  could, however, be included.  Lagged 
variables, including lagged income, can be used as instruments in place of contemporaneous 
covariates. This requires that past information be not correlated with errors at time t. 
Taking for example income variables, parents’ (permanent) income, can be thought of as 
yp t = yp t -1  +e pt, where e pt is an iid random variable whose expected value at time t-1 is zero. 
Child’s income can be modelled slightly differently as yc t = yc t-1 + azt-1+e ct, where z is a vector 
including variables such as age, experience, education, job search activity, health. e ct is also 
an iid random variable whose expected value at time  t-1 is zero. It may or may not be 
correlated with e pt, but it cannot be correlated with uOUT,t and uIN,t. It is important to notice that 
the child’s actual decision may take place when, say, he has actually never worked yet. The 
interpretation of  yct  then becomes that of potential income y
*, ie, the income the child could 
earn if working full-time at time  t, and similarly for previous periods, and I assume that the 
child can form an expectation of this. The model would then need to be changed accordingly, 
as shown in ( 5.2) below. 
Assuming, as I did earlier, that t he indirect utility functions are linear, the conditional 
probability of leaving home in period t (( 3.18)) can be written as 
( 3.19)  lit = Pr (OUTit =1 | OUTi,t-1=0) = Pr (et < b 1 yct-1 + b 2 ypt-1 + b 3 pht + b b4 zt-1 +y y1xt ) 
| et-1 >b 1 yct-2 + b 2 ypt-2 + b 3 pht-1 + b b4 zt-2 + y y1xt-1) 
where b i= (b OUT, i - b IN, i) i = 1, 2 , 3,  b b4= (b OUT,1 - b IN,1)a a and et = ut
IN - ut
OUT - b 1ect -b 2ept. The 
theoretical model leads us to expect b 1>0, b 2<0, b 3 <0 if housing demand is inelastic with 
respect to price, and each component of  b b4 to have the same sign as the corresponding 
element in a a. 
In the empirical section I will consider all children living with their parent(s) at time t-1 and 
estimate the following index function measuring the propensity for child i to leave the parental 
home: 
( 3.20)  Ii,t = b 1 ycit-1 + b 2  ypit-1 + b 3 phit + b 4zt-1  + y y1xt +q i+ h it 
The error h it = u it + b 1ect +b 2ept is an innovation error that reflects unexpected changes in 
tastes and incomes, ie h it is assumed to be iid, not correlated with the explanatory variables; I 
also assume that q i is uncorrelated with the covariates and with h it. 
 
4  Data 
I use three datasets in this paper, the ECHP, for most EU countries, the BHPS, for the UK 
and the SOEP, for Germany. 
The European Community Household Panel (ECHP) is a standardised annual longitudinal 
survey carried out in the European Union since 1994. All current EU member countries, bar 
Sweden, are represented, but Austria and Finland only joined in wave 2 and 3 respectively. 
The ECHP focuses on individual sample members, who are followed if they leave their 
original households. New sample members are children borne to sample members, but not 
anyone else who joins the sample members’ household after the initial wave. Some 60,000 
households and ca 130,000 people aged 16 years and over are interviewed every year. The 
questionnaires and procedures are fairly standard across countries, but there are differences, 
mainly in sample selection and anonymisation.
16 Only the first four waves are currently 
available. The interviews took place mostly in the calendar year following the survey year 
(1994 for the first survey, relating to 1993, etc.). Living arrangements refer to the day of 
interview. Income and labour market variables are usually available both for the current 
week/month and for the whole survey year. 
Since the quality of the UK part of the ECHP suffers from high attrition, and the German 
panel has no regional information and is also of limited size, I also conduct some analyses on 
the British Household Panel Study (BHPS) and the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP). 
The BHPS is a nationally representative sample of British households interviewed for the 
first time in autumn 1991. The original sample respondents have been interviewed, along with 
their co-residents, approximately every year thereafter. There are six thousand private 
households (about ten thousand persons) interviewed e very year from the beginning of 
                                                 
16 Peracchi (2000) gives a more precise illustration of the general structure of the data and of attrition, non-response, 
weighting and imputation features. Determinants of young Europeans’ decision to leave the parental household 
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September and until the beginning of the following year. Children are interviewed only from 
the age of sixteen (see Taylor (1999)).. 
The GSOEP is an annual panel of six thousand households (fifteen thousand individuals) 
that began in 1984 in West Germany with a design quite similar to that of the US PSID. It was 
then expanded in 1990 to cover the new Eastern regions. It currently contains ca. 6000 
households that are interviewed every year. The GSOEP data provide a detailed account of 
income and employment status and are therefore particularly suitable for labour market 
studies.(see Haisken-De New and Frick (1998)). 
 
 
5  Empirical analysis 
I analyse the probability of departure of all people who are still living in the parental 
household in any one wave and on whom I have some information on their living 
arrangements in the following year. Living in the parental household (ie being a “child”, thus 
being at risk of departure): I define “children” all people who are in the same household of at 
least one parent of theirs, natural or legal, at the time of interview. Children temporarily away 
are not included  if they have not had a completed personal interview. Therefore a “parent” is 
a person who is in the same household of at least one child of theirs, natural or legal, at the 
time of interview (including most children who are temporarily away, as explained below). 
Departure is defined as leaving the parental household in the period between one interview 
and the following one to enter any other living arrangement where no parent is present. Living 
without a partner is a situation where no other member of the household is classified as 
partner (married or unmarried spouse) of the individual, while living with a partner is when 
there is a partner. 
Only people aged 18-35 (inc.) are included in the analysis for Greece, Italy, Spain and 
Portugal, and only people aged 18-30 for all other countries.
17 The lower bound represents 
the start of adulthood when children can take their own decisions. Before that age, departures 
rates are negligible around  the Mediterranean and 1% elsewhere. The upper bound has been 
chosen because the number of children still living with their parents is, by that age, extremely 
low in the North and somewhat stable in the South (as if the child had decided to live with 
their  parents for the rest of their life). Children who entered military service are excluded 
because they are not “at risk”. Student departures are also excluded (children who are 
student in the current year and leave while remaining students). Whenever possible, I 
classified those who are not interviewed by using additional information on the reasons for 
non-interview to minimise bias due to attrition.
18 A limitation of the data is that whenever a 
child is “temporarily away” at the time of interview, whether the child has left or not depends, 
in practice, on the view of the parents; according to Eurostat definitions, however, it should 
depend on whether the child intends to return to his household. 
Amongst all ECHP children living with their parents, I find an overall (weighted) average 
departure rate of ca 8%. The departure rates are much lower in the South, where the risk of 
departure stays extremely low at early ages and then increases, but they are significantly 
higher in the North, as illustrated in Table 4. The differences are large and significant between 
North and South, and sometimes within each group as well.
19 Since the ECHP sample sizes 
are relatively large in the South and Southerners’ departure rates are lower, the number of 













                                                 
17 The age refers to the year following the interview in which they are still living with their parents. Some countries in 
the North have so few “children” aged 30 or above that it was necessary to reduce the upper bound to less than 30 
years old. 
18 If the child is the only member leaving a household, or one of those leaving while neither parent leaves, and so on, 
I can say that the child has left the parental home. 
19 . S.e. are in the range 0.003-0.006 for Greece, Italy and Spain, 0.006-0.008 for Portugal and France, and 0.01-0.02 
elsewhere. Determinants of young Europeans’ decision to leave the parental household 




                sex       
  Country    male  female 
__________________________ 
   GREECE   0.083   0.123 
    ITALY   0.047   0.057 
    SPAIN   0.058   0.067 
 PORTUGAL   0.068   0.078 
  AUSTRIA   0.088   0.143 
   FRANCE   0.102   0.123 
  GERMANY   0.073   0.100 
 LUXEMBOU   0.058   0.099 
  BELGIUM   0.082   0.102 
       UK   0.154   0.185 
  IRELAND   0.128   0.174 
       NL   0.148   0.168 
  DENMARK   0.209   0.304 
__________________________ 
 OVERALL    0.083   0.104 
 
Table 4 – average departure rates  by country and sex (1994 –1995) (age 18-35)  
Austria 1995 only. 
 
_____________________________________________ 
                        sex 
   Country          M       F         Total 
_____________________________________________ 
    GREECE       2400       1820       4220  
     ITALY       4458       3658       8116  
     SPAIN       4026       3380       7406  
  PORTUGAL       2561       1974       4535  
   AUSTRIA        713        470       1183  
    FRANCE       1854       1488       3342  
   GERMANY       1337        795       2132  
  LUXEMBOU        293        233        526  
   BELGIUM        917        711       1628  
        UK        807        572       1379  
   IRELAND       2457       1805       4262  
        NL       1132        759       1891  
   DENMARK        421        285        706  
_____________________________________________ 
     Total      23376      17950      41326 
Table 5 – number of observations by country and sex (1994 –1995)  





In the theoretical section the derived  index function measured the propensity for child i to 
leave the parental home as: 
( 5.1)  Iit = b 1 yci,t-1 + b 2 ypi,t-1 + b 3 phit + b 4Zt-1  + y y1xt +q i+ h it 
while what one can observe is OUTit=1 if Iit >0 and OUTit =0 if Iit £0. In a model where the 
determinant of departure is potential income (y
*) the index function becomes 
( 5.2)  Iit = b 1 y
*
cit + b 2  ypi,t-1 + b 3 phit + b 4Zt-1  + y y1xt +q i+ h it 
I am looking at people’s living arrangements in e ach wave excluding the first of each 
panel, explained with variables referring to either time  t or the months between t-1 and t (eg, 
potential income, and, ideally, labour and housing market information), or variables at t-1, the 
time of interview (eg, household size), or in the 12-18 (ca.) month-period before time t-1 (eg, 
parental income, or own income when potential income is not used). 
 
Dichotomous model 
By assuming that both q i and h it are normally distributed, the equation can be estimated 
using  a random effects probit model.
20 The dependent variable is whether the person leaves 
home (OUT=1) or not (OUT=0) before the following interview. Such a model can be estimated 
on all “children”, ie, those who are still living with at least one of their parents in a wave, and 
study what affects their departure from the parental home in the following 12 months. 
However, the estimates of coefficients and standard errors using a standard probit are 
extremely similar to the ones from a random effects probit (I can thus confirm the findings by 
Ermisch (1999)), which is computationally much more expensive. This implies that a pooled 
model is acceptable. 
                                                 
20 In a panel context, the autocorrelation in the error introduced by q i may badly affect the standard errors, while 
retaining the consistency of the parameters. The standard errors can be corrected as shown by Guilkey and Murphy 
(1993). They also show that for a short panel a standard probit may be as good as a random effects probit model. Determinants of young Europeans’ decision to leave the parental household 




Since the decision to move out may mean forming a household with a partner or living 
without a spouse (ie, living either alone or sharing with others), I suspect that the 
determinants that drive towards the two destinations may actually differ. To describe this 
more complex framework of unordered three-way choice the most appropriate model is the 
random utility model, where the first choice is remaining in the parental home, the second is 
moving out to live without a partner, and the third is moving out to live with a partner. The 
utilities associated with the three possible choices are: 
U1i = b b1'X i + e 1 i   U2i = b b2'X i + e 2i   U3 i = b b3'X i + e 3 i 
The choice will depend on a comparison of utilities for each state, such that: 
    1 if U1 i > U2 i and U1 i > U3 i 
Y i =     2 if U2 i > U1 i and U2 i > U3 i 
    3 if U3 i > U1 i and U3 i > U2 i 
To estimate the model I need to make some assumptions on the distribution of the errors. Our 
preferred model is a multinomial logit, that assumes a Weibull distribution of the error (with 
cumulative density function F(e )=exp(-exp(-e ))).
21 
Subject to property of independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA: the odds between any two 
destinations do not depend on other outcomes available),
22 for K+1 choices the probability of 
choosing option j is 





















This model is not common in the literature on children’s departure from home, and some 
important research progress can be achieved by using it here. After estimating the model it is 
possible to test whether the different destinations are in fact indistinguishable: if they are, they 
can be merged and a simpler dichotomous model can be estimated. 
 
 
Departure equation: choice of explanatory variables 
Implementation of the empirical specification explained above requires consideration of 
the variables that influence departure through the indirect utility function. On the basis of the 
empirical literature and the ECHP data, I include the following covariates. 
Own income: I use net total labour income for the previous calendar year. In the model 
with potential income I use fitted net full-time yearly labour income, whose estimation is 
explained below. For the ECHP I use non-labour non-transfer income (which includes, for 
example, investment income). To account for non linearities in the effects of own (actual) and 
parental income and to allow much easier comparisons across countries, I used quartiles, 
calculated by gender, excluding those with zero labour income on all people aged 18-30 (18-
35 for the South).
23, 
Parental/family income: theoretical reasons indicate that, assuming that parents are not 
liquidity constrained, this should be some measure of parental permanent income. No 
measure of parents’ net assets is available in the ECHP.
24 I therefore use total family income 
minus the child’s income. Both are net amounts for the previous survey (calendar) year. I 
used an OECD-equivalised scale of household size to standardise it. I treat parental variables 
as exogenous. Income variables therefore refer to many months before time  t, ie the time of 
possible departure, which should reduce significantly the risk of endogeneity with the iid 
component of the error, while personal characteristics refer to the week that marks the 
beginning of the period of possible departure. 
Personal characteristics: I include demographic covariates such as age group dummies 
(or age, its square and cube), and whether the person lives with a child of theirs (which I treat 
as exogenous).
25 I also include whether the person is studying and their current labour market 
                                                 
21.The alternative model is a multinomial probit, which assumes that errors are jointly standard normally distributed. 
This, however, is a much more time-consuming model to estimate. 
22 Otherwise, the multinomial probit model would have been the appropriate choice. 
23 All other monetary values in this model are expressed in national currencies. Conversion rates are in the appendix. 
Income variables are in thousand units of currency for Ireland and the UK, in million lire for Italy and in hundred 
thousand units for all other countries. All monetary variables are net of taxes for all countries but France. 
24 There is very limited or indirect information on financial variables, eg, on mortgages and on non-labour income. 
25 In the North, less than 1% of males and 1-2% of females cohabit with their parents and a child of their own, so this 
parental dummy can only be included for the South and for Ireland. The general aim was to use the same covariates 
for every country, but it is apparent that the economic structures are quite different and using the same explanatory 
variables may make little sense. For example, one could try to control for household permanent wealth by including Determinants of young Europeans’ decision to leave the parental household 
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status (ie, a dummy to show whether the person is employed in the current week). I also use 
a dummy for foreigners (in Germany). 
Household variables: I have used information (taken from the household questionnaire) on 
the adequacy of the size of the current accommodation. The relative questions are different in 
the datasets so the covariates I am using are different (dummy for ECHP, levels of adequacy 
for SOEP). 
Macro variables: I have included changes in the unemployment rate in all models, even if 
the ECHP does not include detailed information on regions
26 and has very few waves. I use 
regional unemployment rates in Germany and, as possible, for the ECHP, and unemployment 
rates of people aged 18-24 for the respective gender for the UK. 
There are also controls variables: a time trend, regions (UK, not reported), macro-regions 
of residence (Germany, with south Germany as reference) and the available NUTS region (in 
each ECHP subsample). I am not controlling for the original region of respondents in the 
SOEP, even if a significant number of Eastern Germans moved to live in the Western regions 
after 1991. 
 
Estimation of potential income 
I estimate an earnings equation on all 18-35 year old  people. I choose a maximum 
likelihood regression model with selection to control for sample selection bias in the 
employment  decision. Equations are estimated separately by gender, country and wave.
27 
Identification in the probit equation that explains whether a person had been working for most 
of the previous year is  achieved using marriage status, partner’s employment status, own 
health status, whether the person has cohabiting children. For the income equation (which is 
estimated in reduced form), the dependent variable is net labour income for full-time workers 
in t he previous year. Identification is achieved by using own education, own sector, public 
sector dummy, tenure, tenure squared, potential experience, potential experience  squared 
and a dummy for long periods of unemployment in the recent past (the previous five years for 




6  Results 
ECHP 
Table  6 to  Table  9 report the results of the multinomial logit models estimated  for most 
countries included in the dataset. The problem of attrition is serious in some cases, especially 
for the UK. For some countries, the relatively small sample sizes of the national ECHP (in 
terms of households) combined with high rates of departures of children at young ages lead 
to quite small sample sizes of children still living with their parents. I have thus tried to 
aggregate some northern countries (NL, DK, SF), but the results are disappointing. The 
desire to find a common specification, the small sample sizes of children in some subsamples 
means that for some countries the model is not satisfactory and I had to leave them out from 
the final analysis. 
For each country I estimated a dichotomous model, then a multinomial logit, and conduct a 
test to see whether the two categories  (moves out without partner and moves out with 
partner) are indistinguishable. The Wald test for combining outcome categories rejects the 
null of equality of coefficients at the 10% in most of the males equations and in nearly half of 
the females equation.
28 I then computed the Hausman test of the assumption of the 
independence of irrelevance alternatives (IIA) for the omitted category of “leaving to unknown 
destination” (typically representing a case where the youth is not interviewed after leaving 
home, so that we don’t know if they are living with a partner or not). The test always rejects 
                                                                                                                                            
information on whether the household is owner-occupier or is renting their accommodation. It turns out that the sizes 
of the rental market differ widely across Europe, and very few children (0.7%) live in social housing in Greece, 
whereas very few live in private rented accommodation in Ireland (0.4%). Similarly, the probability that a young 
person who is still living with their parents also has a child of theirs is negligible in most Northern countries, and “has 
a child” dummy can generally not be used there (and when it can, it will have very large standard errors). It is 
therefore difficult to include much detail in a “standardised” regression. 
26 I have NUTS3 for most countries, but larger aggregates for some, although large number of observations have no 
information on the region of residence. No regional information at all is distributed for Denmark, Germany and the 
Netherlands (and Luxembourg). 
27 The results for the earnings equations are not included but are available on request. 
28 I have performed the Wald test to show that the base category (stays at home) is not indistinguishable from each of 
the other two categories and the null is nearly always rejected (the expections are the countries where coefficients 
are very. These results are somewhat obvious and I am not including them, but they are available. Determinants of young Europeans’ decision to leave the parental household 
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the null.
29 I have studied whether pooling males and females is acceptable. The answer is 
generally (but not always) negative, as the equality of coefficients is mostly rejected. 
Men’s labour income has typically a positive and significant effect on departures, and the 
effect is, as expected, stronger for departures into a partnership;
30 this effect is sometimes 
(especially in the South) c ompounded with a large negative coefficients for not being 
employed (ie, a large and positive coefficient for being employed at the time of the survey). 
The effect of income does not rise with income in the South, but it does rise with it in 
Germany and the UK. 
For women, there is evidence of an effect of employment status and income in South, but 
not in the North. 
For both sexes, non-labour non-transfer income is sometimes significant but its effect is 
weak. Family income as a clear negative effect on Italian and Spanish youth, but no effect in 
France, UK or Germany. Potential income generally has a positive effect, although only in a 
few cases significantly so. Changes in (macro)-regional unemployment rates have a 
significant effect in several cases. 
 
BHPS 
Given the problems with attrition in the UK section of the ECHP, and because I am very 
interested in studying the UK in depth, I have decided to include a similar analysis on the 
BHPS  (all results are reported in  Table  10). Firstly, I estimate a pooled dichotomous model 
similar to the one used for the ECHP, then a multinomial logit, and conduct a test to see 
whether the two categories  (moves out without partner and moves out with partner) are 
indistinguishable. I c ompared logit (stays home vs leaves home) vs mlogit (stays home, 
leaves without partner, leaves with partner): this means that mlogit is better than a probit/logit 
specification. The Wald test to combine categories rejects the null of equality of coefficients 
for women in the model with actual income, it cannot reject it, however, in the model with 
potential income. For men, the test always rejects the null.
 31 
I have studied whether pooling males and females is acceptable. The answer is always 
negative, as  the equality of coefficients between males and females is rejected for both 
dichotomous models and multinomial logit at the 1% level. Attrition is low so I did not test for 
IIA/unknown destinations. 
The results show that the effects of income vary significantly by gender and by destination. 
The model with actual income shows that this has a strongly positive effect of men and 
women’s probability to move in with a partner; in both cases, this effect rises with income. 
Actual income has no effect on men moving out without a partner and appears to have a 
negative sign on women moving out without a partner. Potential income only has a positive 
effect on females’ departure without a partner. Current employment status only has an effect 
on men’s moving out without a partner. I find no effect of family income. Being a student has a 
strongly negative effect on departures into a partnership, but less so for “single” departures. 
The unemployment rate seems to have a positive effect on the departure of females (but only 
into a partnership). 
 
SOEP 
I compared the logit and the multinomial logit as for the previous datasets and found that 
the latter is preferable, since the Wald test to combine categories rejects the null of equality of 
coefficients is clearly rejected at the 5% or 1% level (all results are reported in  Table  11). I 
also found that the pooling of genders is rejected by the data. Attrition is low so I did not test 
for IIA/unknown destinations. 
The results show that, for men, own labour income has a clear positive effect on 
departures and being employed only affects moving in with a partner. Family income has no 
effect on the formation of partnerships and may delay moving out without a partner, but the 
effect is not clear-cut. 
For women, per capita family income is significant and negative, but the coefficients do not 
become more negative as income grows. I find that women’s labour income is very significant 
for both destinations and its effect increases strongly as income rises, and family income has 
for both destinations a clear negative effect. Being employed at the time of the survey is not 
                                                 
29 Whereas in a dichotomous model (OUT vs IN) attrited children can often be assigned to the OUT category (for 
children’s split-ups, both parents typically remain in the original household, they are interviewed are report that their 
child has moved out). In a multinomial logit model, however, if the child who has moved out is not interviewed, we 
cannot know whether they have moved in with a partner or not. Hence the creating of the “leaving to unknown 
destination” category. 
30 own income is rarely in higher quartiles, especially for countries in the “North”. 
31 Visual inspection of the results also points towards rejection of the hypothesis that the two categories are 
indistinguishable, because each variable’s coefficients for each destination look fairly different. Determinants of young Europeans’ decision to leave the parental household 
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significant. In spite of the length of the panel (1984-1998), there are no significant cohort 
effects in departure rates. Family income delays women’s departure to all destinations. 
The unemployment rate (in first differences) does not appear to be significant. Potential 
full-time income has clearly positive effects for women and an unexpected negative effect on 
men’s departure with a partner (this is not completely at odds with the actual income model, 
where being employed was significant at the 1% level and only the last two own income 
quartiles were significant – it may point out that moving in with a partner requires a job, not 
the potential to earn well in (a hypothetical) one). 
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Table 6  - RESULTS FOR ECHP ACTUAL INCOME, MALES, 1994-1996^ - MARGINAL EFFECTS 
  GREECE  GREECE  ITALY  ITALY  SPAIN  SPAIN  PORTUG.  PORTUG.  FRANCE  FRANCE  GERMANY GERMANY  UK  UK  IRELAND  IRELAND
Males  W/o partner with partner W/o partner with partner W/o partner with partner W/o partner with partner W/o partner with partner W/o partner with partner W/o partner with partner W/o partner with partner
AGE2123  0.0027  0.0146  0.0057  0.0077  0.0068  0.0144  0.0027  0.0117                 
  [0.51]  [1.92]*  [1.50]  [1.45]  [2.35]**  [3.27]***  [0.88]  [1.62]                 
AGE2426  0.0021  0.0131  0.0076  0.0249  0.0089  0.0227  0.0042  0.026  0.0375  0.062  0.0196  0.0484  0.0076  0.0565  0.0236  0.0217
  [0.46]  [1.88]*  [2.29]**  [7.77]***  [3.70]***  [6.11]***  [1.47]  [4.00]***  [3.41]***  [4.48]***  [2.32]**  [7.71]***  [0.39]  [3.93]***  [2.65]***  [4.20]***
AGE2729  -0.0011  0.0247  0.0104  0.0276  0.0118  0.0258  0.0024  0.0186  0.0356  0.0496  0.0278  0.0544  0.0101  0.0433  0.0159  0.0211
  [0.18]  [3.65]***  [3.15]***  [8.02]***  [4.82]***  [6.55]***  [0.64]  [2.42]**  [2.59]***  [2.73]***  [3.16]***  [7.86]***  [0.47]  [2.51]**  [1.44]  [4.01]***
AGE3035  0.0077  0.0202  0.0118  0.0276  0.0101  0.0221  0.0072  0.0042                 
  [1.58]  [2.92]***  [3.52]***  [7.88]***  [3.96]***  [5.60]***  [2.72]***  [0.51]                 
AGE2021                  0.0234  0.0254  0.0102  0.0348  0.0075  0.0387  0.0138  0.0143
                  [2.19]**  [1.63]  [1.20]  [5.09]***  [0.45]  [2.73]***  [1.60]  [2.92]***
AGE2223                  0.0186  0.073  0.0253  0.0441  0.0392  0.0473  0.0275  0.0171
                  [1.54]  [5.91]***  [3.26]***  [7.10]***  [2.60]***  [3.32]***  [3.35]***  [3.54]***
0.0084  0.0044  -0.0009  -0.0006  -0.0008  0.0075  0.0046  0.0058  0.0006  -0.0046  0.0115  0.0103  -0.0189  0.0389  0.0049  0.0076 Own labour 
income Q1  [2.05]**  [0.77]  [0.26]  [0.24]  [0.32]  [2.09]**  [1.61]  [0.67]  [0.06]  [0.42]  [1.43]  [1.75]*  [1.28]  [2.62]***  [0.63]  [1.57] 
Quartile 2  -0.0021  0.0083  -0.001  0.0014  -0.001  0.0101  0.0041  0.0219  -0.0125  0.0076  0.0108  0.0166  -0.0135  0.0429  0.0039  0.0109
  [0.32]  [1.48]  [0.25]  [0.54]  [0.40]  [2.87]***  [1.24]  [2.69]***  [1.09]  [0.62]  [1.11]  [2.43]**  [0.75]  [2.62]***  [0.43]  [2.04]**
Quartile 3  0.0038  0.0125  0.0046  0.0035  0.0031  0.0116  0.0027  0.0225  0.0032  0.0079  0.0088  0.0151  0.006  0.0495  0.0108  0.0157
  [0.61]  [2.05]**  [1.24]  [1.27]  [1.35]  [3.10]***  [0.72]  [2.60]***  [0.25]  [0.50]  [0.79]  [2.12]**  [0.27]  [2.65]***  [1.12]  [2.43]**
Quartile 4  0.0113  0.0069  0.0027  0.0016  0.0018  0.0174  0.0057  0.0373  0.0037  -0.0277  0.011  0.0153  0.0456  0.0659  0.0183  0.0161
  [1.93]*  [0.93]  [0.66]  [0.52]  [0.67]  [4.07]***  [1.55]  [4.04]***  [0.17]  [0.68]  [0.83]  [1.92]*  [1.47]  [2.57]**  [1.51]  [2.34]**
0.0052  -0.0188  -0.0057  -0.0109  -0.0036  -0.013  0.0021  -0.033  -0.0246  -0.0272  -0.0112  -0.0056  0.0043  -0.0074  0.0069  0.0037 Currently not 
employed  [1.37]  [3.28]***  [1.78]*  [3.73]***  [1.82]*  [4.16]***  [0.80]  [4.01]***  [2.94]***  [2.66]***  [1.67]*  [1.32]  [0.31]  [0.57]  [1.02]  [1.26] 
0  0  0.0004  -0.0001  0  0  0  0  0.0003  0.0002  -0.0009  0  0.006  -0.0059  -0.0097  0.0011 Non-L non-
transfer income [1.15]  [0.31]  [1.53]  [0.22]  [0.72]  [1.94]*  [2.04]**  [0.57]  [0.78]  [0.30]  [0.46]  [0.04]  [0.62]  [0.45]  [0.71]  [1.78]*
0.0016  0.0046  -0.0007  -0.0031  0.0018  0.0025  0.0015  0.0093  -0.0084  -0.0086  -0.0048  -0.0017  -0.0095  0.0105  -0.0109  -0.0011 Standardised 
family inc. Q2  [0.34]  [0.93]  [0.23]  [1.59]  [0.85]  [0.89]  [0.65]  [1.53]  [0.62]  [0.54]  [0.43]  [0.30]  [0.38]  [0.50]  [1.34]  [0.35] 
Quartile 3  0.0006  0.0026  0.0007  -0.0034  0  -0.0014  -0.0026  0.0001  -0.0032  -0.0013  0.0023  -0.0002  -0.0208  -0.0027  -0.0154  -0.0006
  [0.11]  [0.49]  [0.24]  [1.66]*  [0.02]  [0.50]  [0.92]  [0.01]  [0.25]  [0.08]  [0.22]  [0.04]  [0.84]  [0.13]  [1.80]*  [0.20] 
Quartile 4  0.007  0.0051  0.0009  -0.0074  -0.0001  -0.0074  -0.0023  0.0001  0.002  -0.0066  0.0026  -0.004  -0.0067  -0.0019  0.0038  0.0015
  [1.63]  [0.96]  [0.29]  [2.88]***  [0.02]  [2.19]**  [0.78]  [0.02]  [0.16]  [0.45]  [0.25]  [0.72]  [0.28]  [0.09]  [0.50]  [0.46] 
D unempl. Rate -0.0052  -0.0021  -0.0007  0.0011  0.0004  -0.0001  -0.0004  -0.0052  -0.0031  0.0106  0.0016  0.0004  0.0006  -0.0079  -0.0041  -0.0008
  [2.23]**  [0.76]  [0.76]  [0.55]  [0.18]  [0.59]  [0.23]  [0.45]  [2.18]**  [0.78]  [1.86]*  [0.40]  [0.01]  [0.08]  [1.29]  [1.22] 
-0.0043  0.0073  0.0068  0.0015  -0.0012  -0.001  -0.0002  0.0052  0.0039  -0.0284  0.004  0.0034  0.0038  -0.002  0.0089  0.0049 accommodation 
short of space  [1.26]  [2.00]**  [3.14]***  [0.90]  [0.74]  [0.46]  [0.11]  [1.12]  [0.41]  [1.91]*  [0.63]  [0.95]  [0.31]  [0.21]  [1.34]  [1.70]*
Observations  3226  3226  6605  6605  5444  5444  3694  3694  1675  1675  3317  3317  1549  1549  2521  2521 
CHI2
# df15  36.121    33.147    11.105    21.769    19.928    18.852    24.467    19.831   
prob  0.002    0.004    0.745    0.114    0.175    0.221    0.058    0.179    
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Table 7  - RESULTS FOR ECHP ACTUAL INCOME, FEMALES, 1994-1996^ - MARGINAL EFFECTS 
  GREECE  GREECE  ITALY  ITALY  SPAIN  SPAIN  PORTUG.  PORTUG.  FRANCE  FRANCE  GERMANY GERMANY  UK  UK  IRELAND  IRELAND
Females  W/o partner with partner W/o partner with partner W/o partner with partner W/o partner with partner W/o partner with partner W/o partner with partner W/o partner with partner W/o partner with partner
AGE2123  0.0076  0.0227  0.0076  0.0244  -0.0044  0.0265  -0.0037  0.003                 
  [1.55]  [1.88]*  [2.58]***  [3.71]***  [1.01]  [3.42]***  [0.89]  [0.29]                 
AGE2426  0.0081  0.031  0.007  0.042  0.0052  0.0509  0.003  0.0209  0.0159  0.09  0.0139  0.0639  0.0344  0.0865  0.0341  0.0395
  [1.66]*  [2.76]***  [2.40]**  [7.91]***  [2.37]**  [8.19]***  [1.22]  [2.23]**  [1.37]  [4.38]***  [1.03]  [5.87]***  [1.57]  [3.36]***  [2.63]***  [4.29]***
AGE2729  0.0106  0.0451  0.0103  0.0395  0.0048  0.0532  0.0018  0.0059  0.022  0.0473  0.0195  0.0631  0.0333  0.0656  0.0379  0.0345
  [1.98]**  [3.66]***  [3.52]***  [6.32]***  [1.88]*  [7.37]***  [0.60]  [0.47]  [1.57]  [1.44]  [1.22]  [4.65]***  [1.33]  [1.99]**  [2.51]**  [3.25]***
AGE3035  0.0074  0.0292  0.0108  0.0388  0.008  0.0472  0.0021  -0.0092                 
  [1.28]  [2.11]**  [3.62]***  [5.96]***  [3.23]***  [6.29]***  [0.80]  [0.74]                 
AGE2021                  0.0132  0.0472  0.0184  0.0453  0.047  0.0865  0.0348  0.0218
                  [1.33]  [2.49]**  [1.79]*  [4.65]***  [2.82]***  [4.00]***  [3.36]***  [2.23]**
AGE2223                  0.0229  0.0799  0.0082  0.0559  0.0551  0.0609  0.0391  0.0284
                  [2.36]**  [4.36]***  [0.65]  [5.43]***  [2.89]***  [2.21]**  [3.47]***  [2.98]***
-0.0024  0.0245  -0.0005  0.0172  -0.0005  0.0238  0.0076  0.0204  -0.0012  0.0667  0.0098  -0.0043  -0.0042  0.0027  0.009  0.0081 Own labour 
income Q1  [0.48]  [2.40]**  [0.12]  [2.59]***  [0.18]  [3.54]***  [2.59]***  [1.72]*  [0.15]  [4.52]***  [0.74]  [0.38]  [0.26]  [0.11]  [0.88]  [0.84] 
Quartile 2  u  u  0.0013  0.0179  -0.0085  0.0164  -0.0008  0.028  -0.0174  0.0517  0.0293  0.0015  -0.039  -0.0128  0.005  0.013 
      [0.31]  [2.22]**  [1.92]*  [2.25]**  [0.17]  [2.33]**  [1.63]  [2.41]**  [2.03]**  [0.12]  [1.69]*  [0.47]  [0.43]  [1.37] 
Quartile 3  0.0047  0.0057  0.0065  0.0193  0  0.0096  0.0061  0.0366  -0.0385  0.0435  0.0244  -0.0037  0.0005  0.0143  -0.0017  0.0266
  [0.87]  [0.38]  [1.69]*  [2.26]**  [0.00]  [1.15]  [1.78]*  [2.80]***  [1.72]*  [1.45]  [1.41]  [0.26]  [0.02]  [0.50]  [0.12]  [2.66]***
Quartile 4  0.0005  0.0291  0.0071  0.0205  0.0001  0.0144  0.0075  0.0237  0.0071  -0.0062  0.0295  0.0017  0.0415  0.046  -0.0019  0.0284
  [0.07]  [1.69]*  [1.73]*  [2.16]**  [0.03]  [1.50]  [2.06]**  [1.49]  [0.48]  [0.12]  [1.52]  [0.11]  [1.57]  [1.30]  [0.11]  [2.55]**
-0.004  -0.0208  -0.0019  0.0037  -0.0044  -0.0099  0.0009  -0.013  -0.0408  -0.0246  -0.0139  -0.0138  0.0357  -0.0301  -0.0055  0.0002 Currently not 
employed  [0.90]  [2.07]**  [0.57]  [0.56]  [2.11]**  [1.67]*  [0.35]  [1.23]  [4.60]***  [1.52]  [1.18]  [1.35]  [2.37]**  [1.39]  [0.60]  [0.03] 
0  0  -0.0009  -0.0025  0  0  0  -0.0003  0.0002  -0.001  0.0016  -0.0053  0.0048  0.005  0.0081  -0.0012 Non-L non-
transfer income [1.34]  [0.77]  [0.78]  [1.00]  [0.80]  [0.01]  [0.22]  [1.11]  [0.94]  [0.93]  [1.32]  [1.37]  [1.25]  [0.90]  [1.84]*  [0.18] 
0.0051  -0.0044  -0.0045  -0.0113  0.0005  -0.008  -0.0012  -0.004  0.0053  -0.0284  0.0079  0.0053  0.0031  0.0223  -0.0188  -0.0027 Standardised 
family inc. Q2  [1.01]  [0.43]  [1.71]*  [2.04]**  [0.23]  [1.36]  [0.55]  [0.44]  [0.55]  [1.39]  [0.67]  [0.57]  [0.17]  [0.85]  [2.01]**  [0.39] 
Quartile 3  0.0026  -0.0173  -0.0054  -0.0019  -0.0009  -0.0135  -0.0009  -0.0052  0.0029  0.0048  0.0015  -0.01  -0.0151  0.0092  -0.0266  -0.0002
  [0.48]  [1.58]  [2.02]**  [0.36]  [0.43]  [2.12]**  [0.42]  [0.57]  [0.29]  [0.26]  [0.13]  [1.03]  [0.83]  [0.36]  [2.60]***  [0.03] 
Quartile 4  0.0073  -0.0154  -0.0023  -0.012  0.0019  -0.0106  -0.0046  -0.0111  0.0008  0.0006  -0.0003  -0.024  -0.0183  0.023  -0.0224  -0.0147
  [1.46]  [1.34]  [1.00]  [2.07]**  [0.99]  [1.64]  [1.49]  [1.07]  [0.09]  [0.03]  [0.02]  [2.31]**  [1.00]  [0.91]  [2.07]**  [1.73]*
D unempl. rate  0.0022  -0.0099  -0.002  0.005  0.0002  -0.0005  0.0006  0.0027  -0.0019  0.0019  0.0053  -0.0205  0.0096  0.003  -0.0107  -0.0038
  [0.83]  [1.63]  [1.70]*  [2.25]**  [0.28]  [0.25]  [0.66]  [0.72]  [0.50]  [0.26]  [0.87]  [3.87]***  [1.05]  [0.25]  [2.26]**  [1.16] 
0.0013  -0.0035  -0.0028  -0.0037  0.001  0.0009  0.0012  0.012  -0.0238  0.0023  0.0014  0.0093  -0.0046  -0.0045  -0.011  0.0054 accommodation 
short of space  [0.38]  [0.43]  [1.16]  [0.79]  [0.67]  [0.18]  [0.68]  [1.72]*  [1.67]*  [0.12]  [0.15]  [1.18]  [0.33]  [0.24]  [1.13]  [0.93] 
Observations  2258  2258  5284  5284  4631  4631  2856  2856  1361  1361  2275  2275  1137  1137  1959  1959 
CHI2
# df15  9.632    22.378    20.053    12.642    30.098    27.377    18.94    26.676   
prob  0.842    0.098    0.17    0.63    0.012    0.026    0.216    0.031    
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Table 8  - RESULTS FOR ECHP POTENTIAL INCOME, MALES, 1994-1996^ - MARGINAL EFFECTS 


































AGE2123  0.0011  0.0256  0.008  0.0118  0.0098  0.0242  0.0038  0.0294                 
  [0.19]  [3.18]***  [1.98]**  [1.94]*  [3.31]***  [4.35]***  [1.28]  [3.26]***                 
AGE2426  0.002  0.0285  0.0112  0.0342  0.013  0.0396  0.0035  0.0538  0.0523  0.0787  0.0155  0.0601  0.0265  0.0815  0.031  0.0267
  [0.42]  [4.26]***  [3.29]***  [9.68]***  [5.36]***  [9.41]***  [1.20]  [7.72]***  [5.23]***  [6.95]***  [1.57]  [7.69]***  [1.35]  [5.87]***  [3.61]***  [5.12]***
AGE2729  -0.0014  0.043  0.015  0.0387  0.0158  0.0475  0.0025  0.042  0.0552  0.077  0.0213  0.0633  0.0299  0.0569  0.0297  0.0226
  [0.23]  [7.35]***  [4.74]***  [10.02]***  [6.59]***  [11.12]***  [0.65]  [4.56]***  [4.20]***  [4.50]***  [1.87]*  [6.81]***  [1.06]  [2.55]**  [2.43]**  [3.82]***
AGE3035  0.0126  0.0348  0.0163  0.0392  0.0125  0.0448  0.0072  0.0189                 
  [2.74]***  [5.09]***  [5.21]***  [9.91]***  [5.17]***  [10.46]***  [2.56]**  [1.74]*                 
AGE2021                  0.0273  0.0114  0.0113  0.0454  0.0142  0.0565  0.0129  0.021 
                  [2.10]**  [0.73]  [1.16]  [5.18]***  [0.92]  [4.11]***  [1.52]  [4.26]***
AGE2223                  0.0274  0.0674  0.0246  0.0565  0.0458  0.0695  0.0286  0.0244
                  [2.09]**  [5.56]***  [2.77]***  [7.42]***  [3.21]***  [5.20]***  [3.77]***  [5.14]***
Potential F.T. 
income  0  0  0.0002  0.0001  0  0  0  0  -0.0001  -0.0007  0.0014  0.0017  -0.0078  -0.0012  -0.0023  0.0017
  [1.42]  [1.62]  [0.88]  [0.59]  [2.06]**  [0.61]  [0.78]  [2.07]**  [0.42]  [2.01]**  [1.54]  [2.21]**  [2.33]**  [0.33]  [1.51]  [1.93]*
0  0  0.0003  -0.0002  0  0  0  0  0.0003  0.0002  -0.0018  -0.0007  0.0146  -0.0072  -0.0091  0.0009 Non-L non-
transfer income [1.91]*  [1.03]  [0.73]  [0.34]  [0.53]  [1.65]*  [0.21]  [0.10]  [0.68]  [0.35]  [0.76]  [0.63]  [1.39]  [0.42]  [0.67]  [1.35] 
0.0017  0.0055  -0.0004  -0.0031  0.0021  0.004  0.0018  0.0142  -0.0112  -0.0018  -0.0045  -0.0011  -0.0092  0.0141  -0.0115  -0.0012 Standardised 
family inc. Q2  [0.33]  [0.99]  [0.13]  [1.38]  [0.93]  [1.09]  [0.79]  [1.86]*  [0.78]  [0.12]  [0.35]  [0.16]  [0.39]  [0.64]  [1.40]  [0.30] 
Quartile 3  0.0014  0.0024  0.0015  -0.003  0.0003  -0.0001  -0.0023  -0.0005  -0.0051  0.0017  0.0032  0.0009  -0.0264  -0.0013  -0.0152  0.0001
  [0.27]  [0.41]  [0.49]  [1.32]  [0.14]  [0.03]  [0.83]  [0.06]  [0.38]  [0.12]  [0.26]  [0.12]  [1.12]  [0.06]  [1.77]*  [0.01] 
Quartile 4  0.0069  0.0052  0.0012  -0.0088  -0.0002  -0.0086  -0.0033  -0.0053  -0.0014  -0.0043  0.0042  -0.004  -0.0139  -0.0057  0.0041  0.0034
  [1.51]  [0.87]  [0.38]  [2.95]***  [0.09]  [1.94]*  [1.06]  [0.62]  [0.11]  [0.31]  [0.35]  [0.57]  [0.61]  [0.26]  [0.54]  [0.88] 
D unempl. rate  -0.0053  -0.0024  -0.0014  0.0002  0.0004  -0.0003  -0.0005  -0.0065  -0.0034  0.0082  0.0026  0.0002  0.0005  -0.0083  -0.0034  -0.001
  [2.17]**    [0.03]  [1.11]  [0.23]  [0.58]  [2.22]**  [0.47]  [1.91]*  [0.77]  [0.02]  [0.56]  [1.29]  [0.07]  [0.63]  [1.00] 
-0.0053  0.0084  0.0064  0.0007  -0.0011  -0.0012  0.0003  0.0063  0.0036  -0.032  0.005  0.0051  0.0019  -0.0026  0.0086  0.0054 accommodation 
short of space  [1.45]  [2.05]**  [2.83]***  [0.35]  [0.62]  [0.42]  [0.15]  [1.09]  [0.35]  [2.19]**  [0.68]  [1.11]  [0.16]  [0.25]  [1.28]  [1.65]*
Observations  3290  3290  6571  6571  5440  5440  3696  3696  1650  1650  3101  3101  1451  1451  2505  2505 
Combine Stat 
CHI2
# df11  25.561    29.983    7.301    10.181    18.37    17.435    14.754    22.659   
Prob  0.008    0.002    0.774    0.514    0.073    0.096    0.194    0.02   
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Table 9  - RESULTS FOR ECHP POTENTIAL INCOME, FEMALES, 1994-1996^ - MARGINAL EFFECTS 


































AGE2123  0.0074  0.0399  0.008  0.0306  -0.0067  0.0266  -0.005  0.0103                 
  [1.48]  [3.05]***  [2.58]***  [4.47]***  [1.54]  [3.01]***  [0.90]  [0.90]                 
AGE2426  0.0079  0.054  0.0073  0.0524  0.0026  0.0538  0.0055  0.0368  0.0181  0.1041  0.0599  0.0695  0.0215  0.1008  0.0357  0.0514
  [1.64]  [4.55]***  [2.26]**  [8.72]***  [1.10]  [6.83]***  [1.85]*  [3.92]***  [1.11]  [3.70]***  [3.53]***  [4.56]***  [0.93]  [4.39]***  [3.12]***  [6.58]***
AGE2729  0.012  0.0724  0.0109  0.0519  0.0034  0.0586  0.0054  0.0267  0.0382  0.0743  0.0588  0.0728  0.0332  0.1045  0.0415  0.0286
  [2.44]**  [6.02]***  [3.24]***  [7.29]***  [1.31]  [7.23]***  [1.43]  [2.13]**  [2.46]**  [2.15]**  [3.31]***  [4.50]***  [1.17]  [3.30]***  [2.73]***  [2.47]**
AGE3035  0.0103  0.0519  0.0133  0.0511  0.0082  0.0559  0.0064  0.0094                 
  [2.01]**  [3.98]***  [4.22]***  [7.69]***  [3.34]***  [7.46]***  [1.96]**  [0.72]                 
AGE2021                  0.0072  0.0464  0.038  0.051  0.0265  0.0871  0.0359  0.0337
                  [0.48]  [1.72]*  [3.14]***  [4.17]***  [1.49]  [4.44]***  [3.48]***  [3.70]***
AGE2223                  0.0166  0.0849  0.0493  0.0606  0.0508  0.0669  0.041  0.041 
                  [0.99]  [2.78]***  [2.97]***  [4.09]***  [2.66]***  [2.56]**  [3.95]***  [5.02]***
0  0  -0.0003  0.0004  0  0  0  0  -0.0004  -0.0006  0.0037  -0.0003  -0.0011  -0.0028  -0.0008  0.0044 Potential F.T. 
income  [1.11]  [1.20]  [1.68]*  [1.32]  [2.66]***  [1.51]  [1.35]  [0.81]  [1.63]  [1.34]  [3.55]***  [0.31]  [0.38]  [0.73]  [0.37]  [2.55]**
0  0  -0.0006  -0.0029  0  0  0  -0.0003  0.0005  -0.0009  0.0005  -0.0066  0.0046  0.0045  0.0079  -0.001 Non-L non-
transfer income [1.58]  [0.48]  [0.51]  [1.17]  [1.42]  [0.26]  [0.06]  [1.08]  [1.91]*  [0.79]  [0.35]  [1.35]  [1.09]  [0.68]  [1.84]*  [0.15] 
0.0056  -0.0047  -0.004  -0.0109  0.0004  -0.0077  -0.0018  -0.0022  0.0035  -0.0247  0.0168  0.0077  0.0082  0.0305  -0.0181  -0.0018 Standardised 
family inc. Q2  [1.10]  [0.43]  [1.44]  [1.94]*  [0.21]  [1.27]  [0.60]  [0.22]  [0.31]  [1.15]  [1.17]  [0.66]  [0.42]  [1.16]  [1.96]**  [0.26] 
Quartile 3  0.0029  -0.0177  -0.0044  0.0002  -0.0006  -0.0137  -0.0008  -0.0029  -0.0016  0.0077  0.0094  -0.0157  -0.0177  0.0145  -0.0242  0.0035
  [0.53]  [1.50]  [1.57]  [0.05]  [0.27]  [2.07]**  [0.29]  [0.29]  [0.14]  [0.39]  [0.65]  [1.27]  [0.88]  [0.56]  [2.43]**  [0.52] 
Quartile 4  0.0084  -0.0124  -0.0012  -0.0116  0.0024  -0.0107  -0.0063  -0.0173  -0.0008  0.0024  0.0089  -0.0296  -0.0209  0.0265  -0.0204  -0.0131
  [1.70]*  [1.03]  [0.48]  [1.99]**  [1.22]  [1.60]  [1.56]  [1.57]  [0.07]  [0.13]  [0.62]  [2.24]**  [1.00]  [1.02]  [1.96]*  [1.49] 
D unempl. rate  0.0017  -0.011  -0.0027  0.0035  0.0004  -0.0005  0.0009  0.0035  -0.0032  0.0017  0.005  -0.024  0.0097  0.0032  -0.0112  -0.0038
  [0.67]  [1.69]*  [2.29]**  [1.59]  [0.56]  [0.24]  [0.73]  [0.87]  [0.73]  [0.21]  [0.67]  [3.54]***  [0.94]  [0.26]  [2.41]**  [1.14] 
0.0013  -0.0033  -0.0038  -0.004  0.0008  0.0009  0.0017  0.0163  -0.028  -0.0016  0.0006  0.0119  0.0045  -0.0143  -0.0123  0.0012 accommodation 
short of space  [0.39]  [0.38]  [1.51]  [0.84]  [0.51]  [0.18]  [0.72]  [2.19]**  [1.68]*  [0.08]  [0.05]  [1.19]  [0.30]  [0.76]  [1.25]  [0.20] 
Observations  2258  2258  5257  5257  4629  4629  2851  2851  1360  1360  1956  1956  1060  1060  1946  1946 
Combine Stat 
CHI2
# df11  9.837    20.906    17.051    6.083    9.261    29.572    7.786    23.737   
Prob  0.545    0.034    0.106    0.868    0.598    0.002    0.732    0.014   
^ = Years are with respect to year when still at home – Ages in sample are 17-34 (South) and 17-29 (rest); income variables in thousand units of currencies, except for Italy 
(million Lira). Own labour-income quartiles are calculated only over positive values of own labour-income. Standardised family income is family income minus own, divided by 
(adjusted) number of family members (minus self). 
#: Wald tests for combining outcome categories Ho: All coefficients except intercepts associated with pair of outcomes “out without a partner” and “out with a partner” are 0 
(i.e., the two categories can be collapsed). 
u u: In Table 7, Greece’s second quartile of women’s own actual income is grouped with the first because no females leave to move in without a partner.  
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Table 10 - RESULTS FOR UK  1991-1998 - MARGINAL EFFECTS 
Ages in sample: 17-30. Income variables in thousand pounds and in 1995 prices. Coefficients on regional dummies 
not reported. Absolute value of z statistics in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
#: Wald tests for combining outcome categories Ho: All coefficients except intercepts associated with pair of 
outcomes “out without a partner” and “out with a partner” are 0 (i.e., the two categories can be collapsed). Own 
labour-income quartiles are calculated only over positive values of own labour-income. Standardised family income is 
family income minus own, divided by (adjusted) number of family members (minus self). 
 
  MALES  FEMALES  MALES  FEMALES 
  OUT alone  OUTpartnr  OUT alone  OUTpartnr  OUT alone  OUTpartnr  OUT alone  OUTpartnr 
age  0.4189  0.2852  0.0838  0.0818  0.3682  0.2992  -0.0407  0.2334 
  [3.17]***  [2.77]***  [0.51]  [0.38]  [2.43]**  [2.70]***  [0.24]  [1.02] 
age2  -0.0175  -0.0111  -0.0028  -0.0016  -0.0153  -0.0115  0.0021  -0.0078 
  [3.05]***  [2.52]**  [0.39]  [0.17]  [2.34]**  [2.43]**  [0.28]  [0.78] 
age3  0.0002  0.0001  0  0  0.0002  0.0001  0  0.0001 
  [2.95]***  [2.30]**  [0.28]  [0.00]  [2.26]**  [2.20]**  [0.32]  [0.57] 
Student  -0.03  -0.0577  -0.0744  -0.0501  -0.0152  -0.0608  -0.0578  -0.0835 
  [1.97]**  [3.07]***  [4.25]***  [1.71]*  [1.15]  [3.53]***  [3.78]***  [3.87]*** 
Not employed  -0.0215  -0.0073  -0.0153  0.0238         
  [1.97]**  [0.90]  [1.17]  [1.04]         
Own labour income Q1  0.0091  0.0197  -0.0279  0.0203         
  [0.77]  [1.81]*  [2.14]**  [0.93]         
Quartile 2  0.0074  0.0287  -0.0422  0.0366         
  [0.54]  [2.50]**  [3.01]***  [1.75]*         
Quartile 3  0.0083  0.0476  -0.0389  0.0496         
  [0.48]  [3.55]***  [2.64]***  [2.31]**         
Quartile 4  0.0277  0.0251  -0.0239  0.0284         
  [1.35]  [1.49]  [1.28]  [1.06]         
Potential F.T. income          0.0017  0.0001  0.0083  -0.0035 
          [0.51]  [0.03]  [2.75]***  [0.86] 
Standardised family inc. Q2  0.0015  0.0015  0.0002  0.0071  -0.0151  0.002  -0.0152  0.0102 
  [0.09]  [0.13]  [0.02]  [0.45]  [0.81]  [0.14]  [1.26]  [0.63] 
S.fam.income Quartile 3  0.0014  0.0006  0.0008  -0.0103  -0.0174  0.0055  -0.0176  -0.0067 
  [0.09]  [0.05]  [0.07]  [0.64]  [0.96]  [0.41]  [1.45]  [0.40] 
S.fam.income Quartile 4  0.0088  -0.0051  -0.0196  -0.0113  -0.009  0.0007  -0.0438  -0.0055 
  [0.56]  [0.45]  [1.34]  [0.65]  [0.50]  [0.05]  [2.87]***  [0.29] 
D unempl. rate (M <25)  0.0033  0.0004      0.0038  0.0009     
  [1.57]  [0.27]      [1.74]*  [0.65]     
D unempl. rate (F<25)      0.0026  0.0106      0.0047  0.0116 
      [0.61]  [1.90]*      [1.09]  [1.99]** 
year  0.003  0.0005  0.002  0.0067  0.0033  0.0014  0.0024  0.0073 
  [1.74]*  [0.46]  [1.01]  [2.70]***  [1.75]*  [1.15]  [1.22]  [2.81]*** 
Observations  2574  2574  1850  1850  2423  2423  1785  1785 
Wald test # Chi2, d.f.  45.860  24  40.771  24  36.014  20  26.497  20 




Table 11 - RESULTS FOR GERMANY 1984-1997 - MARGINAL EFFECTS 
Ages in sample: 17-30. Income variables in thousand marks (DM) and in 1995 prices. Reference region: Southern Germany (Baden-Wüttemberg and 
Bavaria). Absolute value of z statistics in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% #: Wald tests for combining outcome 
categories Ho: All coefficients except intercepts associated with pair of outcomes “out without a partner” and “out with a partner” are 0 (i.e., the two 
categories can be collapsed). Own labour-income quartiles are calculated only over positive values of own labour-income. Standardised family income is 
family income minus own, divided by (adjusted) number of family members (minus self). 
  MALES  FEMALES  MALES  FEMALE 
  OUT alone  OUTpartnr  OUT alone  OUTpartnr  OUT alone  OUTpartnr  OUT alone  OUTpartnr 
age  0.0796  0.152  0.0684  0.5339  0.118  0.2618  0.1211  0.5685 
  [1.44]  [2.34]**  [0.75]  [4.05]***  [1.96]*  [3.82]***  [1.19]  [4.05]*** 
age2  -0.003  -0.0054  -0.0022  -0.0218  -0.0046  -0.0097  -0.0044  -0.0233 
  [1.31]  [1.98]**  [0.56]  [3.86]***  [1.81]*  [3.38]***  [1.00]  [3.89]*** 
age3  0  0.0001  0  0.0003  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0003 
  [1.20]  [1.68]*  [0.39]  [3.69]***  [1.69]*  [3.02]***  [0.82]  [3.72]*** 
employed  0.0047  0.0126  -0.0012  0.0011         
  [1.27]  [2.67]***  [0.24]  [0.14]         
Own labour income Quartile 1  0.0051  0.0042  0.0185  0.0249         
  [1.22]  [0.77]  [3.04]***  [2.59]***         
Own labour income Quartile 2  0.0102  0.0101  0.0287  0.0554         
  [1.93]*  [1.59]  [4.36]***  [5.46]***         
Own labour income Quartile 3  0.011  0.0161  0.03  0.0702         
  [1.90]*  [2.40]**  [3.91]***  [6.02]***         
Own labour income Quartile 4  0.0144  0.0205  0.0377  0.0761         
  [2.05]**  [2.62]***  [4.25]***  [5.41]***         
Standardised family income Q2  -0.0036  -0.0019  -0.0088  -0.0146         
  [1.07]  [0.53]  [1.81]*  [1.92]*         
S. fam. income Quartile 3  -0.0093  -0.0053  -0.0169  -0.0118         
  [2.35]**  [1.23]  [2.99]***  [1.35]         
S. fam. income Quartile 4  -0.0079  -0.0025  -0.0141  -0.0263         
  [1.65]*  [0.47]  [2.06]**  [2.23]**         
Potential F.T. income          -0.0002  -0.0011  0.001  0.0036 
          [1.04]  [3.80]***  [1.73]*  [3.48]*** 
D unempl. rate  0.0016  -0.0023  0.0012  -0.0032  0.0013  -0.0025  0.0016  -0.0031 
  [1.05]  [1.48]  [0.53]  [0.93]  [0.80]  [1.53]  [0.65]  [0.82] 
Standardised family income          0.0002  0.0005  -0.0002  -0.0016 
          [1.45]  [3.73]***  [0.87]  [3.55]*** 
household size  -0.0037  0.0015  -0.0062  0.0025  -0.0012  0.0025  -0.0042  0.0016 
  [3.47]***  [1.83]*  [3.85]***  [1.21]  [1.09]  [2.99]***  [2.37]**  [0.75] 
HOUSINGSIZE_toosmall  0.0066  0.005  -0.0022  0.0203  0.0083  0.0017  -0.001  0.0183 
  [1.09]  [0.89]  [0.22]  [1.68]*  [1.32]  [0.28]  [0.09]  [1.40] 
HOUSINGSIZE_small  0.0052  -0.0062  -0.0006  0.0038  0.0067  -0.0048  0  0.0036 
  [1.61]  [1.65]*  [0.12]  [0.53]  [2.02]**  [1.23]  [0.00]  [0.47] 
HOUSINGSIZE_large  0.006  -0.0108  -0.0073  -0.002  0.0049  -0.0148  -0.0053  -0.0023 
  [1.43]  [1.68]*  [0.85]  [0.16]  [1.12]  [2.15]**  [0.59]  [0.17] 
FOREIGNER  -0.0051  0.0087  -0.0067  -0.0035  -0.004  0.0126  -0.0057  -0.0048 
  [1.66]*  [2.92]***  [1.47]  [0.53]  [1.24]  [4.14]***  [1.11]  [0.67] 
Macroregion: Berlin  0.0173  0.0138  0.0217  -0.0157  0.0183  0.0114  0.0201  -0.0321 
  [2.49]**  [1.36]  [1.89]*  [0.52]  [2.39]**  [1.01]  [1.55]  [0.99] 
Macroregion: East  0.0024  0.0138  0.0059  0.0119  0.0016  -0.0014  0.0129  0.0273 
  [0.55]  [2.98]***  [0.90]  [1.23]  [0.30]  [0.22]  [1.57]  [2.17]** 
Macroregion: WestCentral  0.0029  0.0028  0.0068  -0.0056  0.0033  0.0029  0.0076  -0.0067 
  [1.03]  [0.99]  [1.63]  [0.89]  [1.11]  [1.01]  [1.61]  [0.98] 
Macroregion: North  0.005  0.0036  0.0156  0.018  0.0046  0.0031  0.0166  0.0195 
  [1.35]  [0.88]  [2.88]***  [2.12]**  [1.17]  [0.74]  [2.65]***  [2.08]** 
Year  0  0  -0.0002  0.0004  0  0.0015  -0.001  -0.0002 
  [0.12]  [0.10]  [0.30]  [0.45]  [0.09]  [2.62]***  [1.51]  [0.16] 
Observations  9878  9878  5950  5950  9740  9740  5882  5882 
Wald test
# CHI2, d.f.  66.18  22  37.758  22  59.183  16  27.548  16 
Prob  0.000    0.020    0.000    0.036    
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7  DISCUSSION 
ECHP 
Men’s labour income has typically a positive and significant effect on departures, and the 
effect is, as expected, stronger for departures into a partnership. For men, I find that it is only in 
the South that not being in employment has a negative, strong effect. Non-labour non-transfer 
income is sometimes significant b ut its effect is weak (sorry for the table’s roundings after the 
fourth decimal figure). Note that own income is rarely in higher quartiles, especially for countries 
of the “North”. 
Family income as a clear negative effect for Italian and Spanish youth. This is an important 
result that strengthens the findings of  Manacorda and Moretti (2000) for Italy and shows that 
Aassve, Billari, and Ongaro (2000) may have underestimated the role of parental income by using 
a dichotomous model rather than a multinomial one. In particular, I find a clearly negative effect of 
family income on men’s departures with a partner, and a not-so clear negative effect on women 
(both destinations).  Aassve, Billari, and Ongaro (2000) find very weak evidence of family income 
effect for women and no effect at all for men. They find very large and strong effects of own 
employment and income but this is partly due to the structure of the equation, that only includes 
age in a first-step selection model. They find that being employed has a very large effect on 
departure rates: for employed men in the second to fourth quartile, the marginal effect is more 
than 10 percentage points. However, their standard errors are very large (the true effect could be, 
roughly, between 3 and 18 percentage points. Since older Italians are more likely to be employed 
and on relatively high incomes, the effect of being employed and on a high salary may in fact be 
capturing an age effect. Although I find approximately the same gross effect, my results show that 
the effect of employment and income are very significant and large, but not as extreme as theirs. 
Potential income generally has a positive effect, although only in a few cases significantly so. I 
believe the estimation of potential earnings may need to be improved. However, the fact that 
potential income has no effect in the South is not surprising if we believe that having a job 
(especially a secure one, as legal jobs often are in the South) is essential for a youth to be able to 
contemplate moving out, because state transfers are extremely limited, especially for those 
without a job and contribution history. In the specification with potential income, the coefficients 
on changes in unemployment rates are often significantly different from zero. 
Italian females departures into partnership rises with unemployment (the same found using 
Germany’s SOEP), which is interesting.
32 My results for Italy are only partly consistent with 
Aassve, Billari, and Ongaro (2000), who find a negative effect of regional unemployment rate (in 
levels) on men’s departure, but this is very small ( -0.003, s.e. 0.001)). Using first differences, I 
find significant effects for women, with somewhat larger effects (0.005) for women moving in with 
a partner, and a negative effect (-0.002) for those moving in without a partner. 
 
 
UK - BHPS 
The analyses conducted on the BHPS show that the effects of income vary significantly by 
gender and by destination. In particular, own actual income has a strong  positive effect on 
departure into partnerships, and this effect rises with income. I find no evidence, however, of any 
effect of income for men’s departures without a partner, but I find a  negative effect for women’s 
departure without a spouse. This is an important result because it shows that in papers where 
only one destinations (leaving home) is used, the coefficients will be of limited use, as they will lie 
somewhere between the effects for each destination. In the case where the effects of a variable 
go in different directions for each destination, as I clearly found for own income, a researcher may 
wrongly conclude that the variable is not significant in affecting the leaving home decision. 
Being a student has a strongly negative effect on departures into a partnership, but less so for 
“single” departures (this is plausible, since some of these departures  will be students who 
complete their education in the next few months and move out). 
The unemployment rate seems to have a positive effect on the departure of females (but only 
into a partnership), as found by  Ermisch (1999). It is not necessarily surprising that 
unemployment is not significant for males’ partnership formations because females may marry 
males who have already left the parental home. 
                                                  
32 Different rates of departures into partnerships between men and women are not necessarily inconsistent, 
because women may leave the parental home to move in with a (previously single, say) partner who had 
been living outside the parental home. So, for example, higher unemployment may lead to women looking 
harder for a partner but only amongst men with a (good) job and older than they are, and these are likely to 




GERMANY - SOEP 
For Germany, my model based on the SOEP yields many interesting results and significantly 
extends the descriptive results found in Gartner (2000). The quality of the results using the SOEP 
is better than the ones based on the ECHP. 
I find, for both genders, that own income increases the probability of departure and that being 
employed only affects moving in with a partner (this is consistent with the idea that own income ). 
In contrast to what found for Southern Europe and the UK, however, own income always 
increases the probability of departure, ie, also for moves without a partner. Family income delays 
both kind of departures for women but, for men, only departures into a relationship; in both cases 
the effect rises with income. As found for the previous datasets, this confirms the superiority of a 
model with multiple destination to a dichotomous model. The unemployment rate (in first 
differences) that I use does not appear to be significant; probably a more precise measure (by 
gender/age) is necessary. 
It appears that my results significantly differ from Gartner (2000)’s, which are based on a less 
than ideal definition of destinations and choice of variables in the regression. He finds a strong 
effect on men of being employed full-time, while all other possible labour market activities do not 
significantly affect departure. Pro-capita total family income (others’ plus own in one) and parents’ 
education have no effect. For women, he finds that being employed or in training increases 
departures to multi-person households, but only being in training increases departures to single-
households. Per capita family income i s significant and negative, but the coefficients do not 
become more negative as income grows (he uses income levels dummies). His unusual 
classifications of destinations and the fact that it does not discriminate between own and other 
members’ income seem to be the reason behind these obviously different results. 
 
 
8  CONCLUSIONS 
Previous studies of young people’s departure from the parental home largely used cross-
sectional studies in a single-country context. In this paper I have used the first three waves from 
the ECHP to explore the determinants of departure across Europe. The shortcomings of the 
dataset are outweighed by the feasibility of direct comparisons across the EU. 
I posit a model in which economic variables play an important role. A standard analytical 
framework on a multi-country dataset is used to show the main differences across Europe, 
although it is unable to capture the individual differences in economic structures and social 
security systems. I start by replicating a model that looks typical of the household formation 
literature and includes own income, and then substitute this with potential earnings. The 
econometric model used is a multinomial logit where the destinations are staying at home, 
moving out to live without a partner and moving out to live with a partner.  
The results of the multinomial logit models and Wald tests very clearly show that the effects of 
economic variables mostly differ by destination, both in magnitude and sometimes also in sign, 
proving that the dichotomous model  commonly found in the literature is unsatisfactory and 
misleading. 
Demographic and economic variables appear to influence young people’s living 
arrangements, and the effects differ by country and by destination. Current income and current 
employment status have a powerful effect on males and females in the South, which can explain 
their lower departure rates. Own (actual) income has a positive effect on males in most EU 
countries and is often significant, although more so in the South. The effect of being out of work 
during the interview week, even controlling for student status, is negative, significant and 
important in the South, reflecting the importance for Southern males of having a job before 
leaving the parental nest. Higher family income discourages departures in the South, but only a 
smaller effect is found for the North.
33  
The results presented in this paper strongly confirm the suspicion that the low departure rates 
in the South and low marriage rates are the result of limited labour market opportunities: children 
in the South largely stay in the parental home and delay the forming of cohabiting relationships if 
they have not secured a job. 
                                                  
33 Ermisch and Di Salvo (1997) find a similar effect of parents socio-economic group in a model without parental income. 
Their interpretation of this result is that it may reflect the fact that children of better-off families are more willing to risk 
leaving the parental home because they may be able rely on transfers in case of need. Another explanation is that 
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